It has been argued that Ethiopia survived as an African State because, by the Wichale Treaty of 2 May 1889 between Emperor Menelik and Count Autoneko. She had become an Italian protectorate. Article III of the treaty was in a sense the legal birth certificate of the Italian colony of Eritrea, because it defined for the first time in treaty form a boundary line between Ethiopia and a coast area under foreign sovereignty.

The crucial issue in the Ethiopian-Italian war of 1895-6 and 1935-6 was not so nuch the existence or extent of the colony of Eritrea by one of independence versus foreign protection or domination for all of Ethiopia.

 

Article III had given the Italians a foothold in the Ethiopian highlands and the Italian wanted to use it as launching ground on Ethiopia.

 

By Article XVII of the treaty Menelik had bound himself to use the Italian government for all negotiations in matters which might arise with other powers or governments.

 

Although the words, “protectorate” and “protectionism” are conspicuously absent, there can hardly be any arguments about the implications of this clause. In the colonial thinking of the later part of the 19^th century, the establishment of a protectorate over an African territory was closely tied up with the exclusive right to conduct or control its foreign affairs. Thus Article XVII limited Ethiopian sovereignty and actually made Ethiopian an Italian protectorate.In Italian policy this article soon overshadowed all other clauses in its importance.

In this way, it is argued that Ethiopia was sealed off from occupation by other European powers. Once the treaty had been ratified and additional convection following the Italian successes signed on 7 October 1889, the Italian government lost no time in making its claim known to other governments.

 

Article XVIII was accepted by thirteen signatory powers of the Berlin General Act without reservation. But Rudenson has overemphasized the protectorate status of Ethiopia in preventing her becoming a European colony.If the Treaty kept other powers out of Ethiopia, what then prevented Italy herself. Who was left free to do what she liked, from raping Ethiopia during the partition era? Ethiopia’s protectorate status was basically of little value to her continued independence. In any case, Menelik did not regard himself as dependent on Italy as shown by the fact that he continued diplomatic correspondence with other European powers without using Italian channels. He wrote to Britain, France, etc requesting guns to fight Mohammedian invasions and protection against the European embargo on arms sale to African States.

This was an outright violation of Article XVII as it was known in Europe and it brought the validity of Italy’s claims into question. Menelik may have pledged himself to use Italian diplomatic channels whenever he felt them to be of convenient advantage but did not regard Ethiopia as a protected dependence of Italy. After a prolonged diplomatic contest over the meaning of Article XVII, Menelik finally denounced the whole treaty of Wichale, in February 1893, and informed all other European powers of this step.

 

The break was complete, and although further attempts were made by Italy to come to terms with Menelik, the problem of the protectorate paragraph finally led to war and to the battle of Adowa, where Menelik’s unexpected and overwhelming victory solved the conflict in Ethiopia’s favour. In the 26 October 1896 peace, Treaty, the independence of Ethiopia was emphasized and the protectorate paragraph was unrolled.

 

Ethiopia had won by sheer military superiority. Menelik and a United Ethiopia said no to protectorate status. The Battle of Adowa proved that Ethiopia could not become of Italy because she was too strong in relation to be her would be protector. Italy’s defeat solved the problem for Europe and for Menelik over the protectorate issue.

 

Dr. H.S. Marcus has suggested that, between the defeat of the Italians at Adowa and the collapse of the Mahdist army and state at Omdurmas, the external policy of Menelik was dominated by an aggressive campaign of territorial acquisition all along the Western frontier of Ethiopian (“Ethio- British negotiations concerning the Western Border with Sudan”- “1896-1902” by Harold G. Marcus – Journal of African History 1863.)

 

He argues that Britain supported Italian colonial ambitions in Ethiopia as a counter pause to Emperor Menelik’s stated policy of expansion. The defeat of Italy at Adowa in 1896 brought about a vacuum in Ethiopia which opened the Eastern Way to the Nile for France.

Marcus argues that Menelik turned to expansionism which has been called unscrupulous military ambition in which he used Italian arms. He considers that in the Sabat basin, Menelik seriously relied upon the assistance  of the French missions in maiking good the claims put forward in his circular to the powers of Miyazhya 1883 (April 1891).

 

In Dr, Marcus’ view, Menelik’s entente with Khalifa Abdullahi “was no more than reinsurance if the French were not successful, he could still tell the Khalifu that he had been time to the Unity between Ethiopia and Sudan.”

 

On the contrary, Sanderson brings forward the thesis that Menelik was a foresighted diplomat in which, the Mahdist alliance was the central venture of his diplomacy. On this view, Menelik deliberately sacrificed the French was little more than a ruse to retain their goodwill and support at a time when massive military and diplomatic intervention by Europeans in northeast Africa, creating, in Menelik’s eyes at least, a very critical situation for Ethiopia.

 

Sanderson sees Menelik as a strategist who did not invade powerful Sudan but consolidated the Western border to protect himself from Egypt. He does not see Menelik’s policy as dominated by a drive for territorial aggrandizement. Sanderon concludes that so long as the powerful Mahadist State (Sudan) was in effective control of the frontier areas, Menelik was prepared to sacrifice some of his most cherished territorial ambitions in order to avoid a clash with the Khalifa, even if the purely military outcome of such a conflict would have been in his favour.

 

When the Khalifa’s authority crumbled away on the Ethiopian frontier, Menelik, had of course no alterative but to insure against Anglo- Egyptian action by staking his claims to those regions which the especially coveted. Although Menelik enjoyed military superiority to his neigh bours, he preferred skillful diplomacy as opposed to sheer force.

 

Thus Sanderson (Foreign Policy of the Negus Menelik”, G.N. Sanderson, Journal of African History Vol V 1964) says that Menelik was not only a great warrior  but a subtle and far- sighted diplomatist with, at times, an almost Bismarckian capacity for keeping several irons in the fire. By 1896 Menelik, naturally enough after his experience with the Italians, had become extremely, perhaps excessively, sensitive to “European threats.” Menelik had knocked out the Italians at Adowa, only to find that another more formidable power had entered the military arena in North – East Africa.

 

Menelik was afraid that British advance up the Nile might ultimately threaten Ethiopia, so he tried to make an alliance with the Khalifa in the face of a common enemy. Menelik’s foreign policy was dominated by the need to protect Ethiopia against the converging, British threat -Kitchner in the north, and Macdonald in the South. Menelik had enough respect for British military power to shrink from a head- on collision with so powerful an adversary. Thus Menelik’s maintanance of an entente with the Sudan was caused by the looming danger of European Powers, France and Britain.

 

Sanderson’s argument is that, Ethiopia escaped partition because of Menelik’s Bismarckian diplomacy. This of course raises the question of how much importance one can attach to the role of individuals. Sanderson concludes thus on Menelik’s diplomacy” “The Entente with Omduruman was therefore an integral and indispensable part of Menelik’s solution to Ethiopia’s “European problem,” which the Battle of Adowa seemed for a time not to have solved but rather to have revived in a new and even more dangerous form.” Sanderson has undeniably placed too much emphasis on the role of Menelik as an individual in preserving Ethiopian independence.

 

What saved Ethiopia was undeniably the popular sense of unity-a common language, a common religion-far more than the role of the leader. In fact, the unity threw up a powerful leader to the front. There was a strong cohesive national identity supported by a strong army. The rulers, Tewedros, Johannis and Menelik had constructed a strong nation state. Moreover the State had basic goegraphical identity-enclosed within inaccessible mountains. Here lay the reasons rather than simply European weakness. The force in a popular unity was able to overthrow foreign aggression and save Ethiopia from European colonization.

Examination Questions

1. What factors enabled Menelik II of Ethiopia to become the only African leader to resist successfully a European attempt at conquest?
2. Did Johannes IV have more success than Theodros II in uniting Ethiopia and preserving its independence?
3. Which of Ethiopia’s rulers in this period contributed most to the country’s unity, modernization and security from invasion?
4. “Tewodros had vision, ambition and energy in all that he did.” Why then did he fail?